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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
requires evidence of the same type as the courts require, except that due
to its specialized nature, it is better equipped to probe more deeply into
the same complex relevant economic facts that the courts consider in
order to determine whether competitidn has been or probably will be
substantially lessened.31
From the foregoing it is apparent that the mere doing of a substantial
amount of business by an alleged violator is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the qualifying clause of Section 3. The major factor in
the substantiality test is the amount of business foreclosed by the exclu-
sive dealing arrangements. However, the courts do broaden an inquiry
to include such factors as the rank in the industry, practice in the indus-
try, number and per cent of outlets foreclosed, rigidity of enforcement
of the restrictive practices, alleged violator's share of the market, length
of the contracts, intent of the parties, availability of alternative ways of
obtaining an assured market, and the economic power and capacity of the
alleged violator to enforce restrictive provisions.
The fact that it is necessary to make an inquiry into the question of
substantiality makes it clear that exclusive dealing contracts or arrange-
ments are not legal per se. On the other hand, the fact that such inquiry
is made does not mean that the rule of reason is employed. The tech-
nique adopted to determine the question of substantiality is similar to
that in the rule of reason. But the analogy goes no further. Once sub-
stantiality is found to exist, these arrangements may be said to be illegal
per se because there is no further inquiry into the reasonableness or bene-
ficial effects that may, in fact, flow from such arrangements in a particu-
lar case. But it must be emphasized that the necessity of finding sub-
stantiality precludes such contracts from being per se illegal. Thus, it
appears that the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have carried
out the congressional intent in regard to exclusive dealing arrangements
by applying a test of legality that falls between the rule of reason and
illegality per se tests. JAMES R. STRICKLAND.
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Unjustified Price
Discrimination-Additional Requirements Necessary to
Constitute Violation of Section 2 (a).
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act,' prohibits an interstate seller from making certain price dis-
criminations. The section in part states:
3 Cf. Revlon Products Corporation, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.)
25,184, notion to reopen denied, 125,249 (F. T. C. 1954); Beltone Hearing Aid
Co., 3 CCH TRADE RE. REP. (10th ed.) 125,397 (F. T. C. 1955) (Here the order
is not a final Commission order, but a hearing examiner's ruling.)
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §13 (19476), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526
(1938), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
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"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers or commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, .... and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition qc tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimi-
nation, or with customers of either of them...."
In addition to an unjustified price discrimination 2 this statute seems to
require that (1) the defendant be engaged in interstate commerce, (2)
the discrimination occur in the course of such interstate commerce, and
(3) the discrimination be of such a nature that the effect may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition. This note
assumes the existence of a price discrimination3 and will deal only with
these additional requirements of Section 2(a).
With the exception of the "flow of commerce ' 4 and "bulk storage"'5
doctrines, courts find little trouble in determining whether the alleged
price discriminator was engaged in interstate commerce. 6 Since the
"affection doctrine"7 of the Sherman Act has been found inapplicable
to Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,8 a defendant solely engaged in intra-
state commerce is not within the coverage of this section regardless of
any effect his discrimination may have on interstate commerce.9
' Certain defenses are available to the alleged discriminator in justification of
his price differences. They are contained in Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2
of the Clayton Act. For a recent discussion see Fortas, Affirmative Legal De-
fenses, How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 187 (Chicago Commerce
Clearing House, 1954).
For a discussion of this problem see Correa, Discrimination. in Prices, How To
COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 152 (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House,
1954).
' This applies to products which after being produced or refined in one state are
transported across state lines and sold from storage facilities in another state.
Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231 (1951); Midland
Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
' This doctrine refers to intrastate sales where the goods involved were stored
in bulk warehouses or storage tanks but had moved in interstate commerce prior
to the storage. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943) ; Alabama
Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386
(N. D. Ala. 1939).
o Austin, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN AcT 14 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953).
' Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219
(1948).8 Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Spencer v. Sun
Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950.)
'But see Bowamn Dairy Co v. Hedlin Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE REG. REP.
(10th ed.) 1167,959 (N. D. Ill. 1954). The defendant was an intrastate dealer and
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The requirement that the discrimination must have occurred in the
course of defendant's interstate commerce has caused difficulty. It has
been established that if defendant's goods are moving to him across state
lines, as in the "flow of commerce" cases, then any discriminatory prices
in his later sales will meet this requirement. This may be illustrated by
a case in which the defendant refines gasoline in Indiana, ships it to
storage tanks in Illinois, and competes with plaintiff, an intrastate dealer
who buys gasoline from an Illinois corporation and sells it in Illinois.
Defendant's discriminatory sales to customers of plaintiff would be in the
course of his interstate commerce.10 Section 2(a) may also be held
applicable even if only one of the discriminatory sales was made in inter-
state commerce."- On the other hand, most courts have taken the view
that a discriminatory act in intrastate commerce resulting in an injury
to an intrastate merchant is not deprived of its local character merely
because the same seller is conducting other transactions in interstate
commerce. For example, in Shlonmchik v. Hygrade Bakery Company"
the defendant manufactured bakery products and sold them in interstate
commerce. The plaintiff, an intrastate operator, sold similar products.
The defendant was charged with following plaintiff's salesmen and un-
derselling them while at the same time defendant was maintaining higher
prices elsewhere. In regard to the jurisdictional requirement that the
discrimination must occur in the course of defendant's interstate com-
merce, the court said:
"In order for the sales here involved to come under the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, they must have
been made in interstate commerce. The fact that the defendant
conducts other business across state lines is not enough, nor is the
additional fact that the effect of the discrimination may be to
lessen competition with the person [the defendant in this case]
who grants the benefit of such discrimination."' 3
The court further said that Congress plainly did not intend to regulate
the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had by means of discriminatory prices taken customers away from the
plaintiff. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that none
of the alleged practices had occurred in interestate commerce. The court in denying
defendant's motion relied on Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S.
115 (1954). The parties in the Aead case represented the converse of this situation
with the defendant there being the party engaged in interstate commerce. How-
ever, the court said that since the plaintiff would be amenable to suit by the de-
fendant under the Mead decision, then the plaintiff must be accorded a correspond-
ing right.
"0 Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
" The present language of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act is that it covers
situations "where either of any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are
in commerce."
12 C. C. H. TRADE REG. REP. (1953 Trade Cas.) U 67,632 (E. D. Pa. 1953).1 Id at 68,992.
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every transaction of every business engaged in interstate commerce and
that the phrase "in the course of such commerce" indicates an intent to
limit the operation of the Act to interstate transactions and not to at-
tempt to regulate those which are wholly intrastate even though part of
the seller's business may be interstate. This action was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.' 4
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Moore's Bakery
v. Mead's Fine Bread Company 5 reached a different result, deciding
that such a discrimination had occurred in the course of defendant's
commerce and was therefore within the scope of Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act.' 6 Mead's the defendant, manufactured bread in New
Mexico and in one town in Texas. The plaintiff, Moore, was a local
baker making and selling his bread only in Santa Rosa, New Mexico.
Plaintiff and defendant were competitors in Santa Rosa. The defendant,
on learning of an agreement by the local merchants to buy exclusively
from the plaintiff, cut the price of his bread below cost and kept it low
until the plaintiff was forced out of business. During this time de-
"4 Accord, Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 93 F. Supp. 670 (D. C. Cal. 1951). The
defendant was engaged in interstate commerce but the discriminatory acts com-
plained of by the plaintiff were made wholly in California. The plaintiff was en-
gaged in intrastate commerce only. The court said the question here was whether
the discrimination was committed in the course of defendant's interstate commerce.
In denying relief under the Clayton Act the court said that Congress had not exer-
cised all of its power over interstate commerce but had dealt only with persons
who were not merely engaged in interstate commerce but who also practiced re-
straints in the course of the interstate commerce. See also Danko v. Shell Oil Co.,
115 F. Supp. 886 (E. D. N. Y. 1953); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F Supp. 547
(N. D. Ill. 1943).iG 348 U. S. 115 (1954). This case was begun March 10, 1949, in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico. It was dismissed at the
close of plaintiff's case on the ground that the plaintiff was "in pari delicto" with
the defendant. This was affirmed in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338
(10th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court, in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 340 U. S.
944 (1951), granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case/for
consideration in the light of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340
U. S. 211 (1951). The district court in a new trial again dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint and rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the price
discrimination was justified under the fourth proviso in Section 2(a) of the Clay-
ton Act, allowing discriminatory prices to meet changed market conditions. This
was reversed and remanded for new trial in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F. 2d
540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 902 (1952). The district court in a
new trial gave judgment for the plaintiff for $57,000 ($19,000 trebled) under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act. This was reversed in Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore,
208 F. 2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U. S. 1012, rev'd sub norn.
Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954).
" A violation of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1528 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 13a (1946), was also found. This section, also known as the Borah-
Van Nuys Act, prevents, inter alia, a person engaged in interstate commerce from
selling goods "in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted
by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying com-
petition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell,
or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor"' This section was once thought to be
criminal only, but now it is conceded that it provides for treble damage actions also.
Note, 31 N. C. L. REV. 454 (1953)..
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fendant's bread prices in the other towns-including the one town in
Texas-remained unchanged. Regarding the jurisdictional requirement
of interestate commerce, the Supreme Court said:
"Respondent [Mead] is engaged in commerce, selling bread both
locally and interstate. In the course of such business, it made
price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate trans-
actions and cutting the price in the intrastate sales.... The vic-
tim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate trans-
actions are used to destroy him."'
7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found an interstate connection on the
ground that the defendant, an interstate merchant, was the beneficiary
of the discrimination. He was financed from his interstate operations
and also from other interstate companies in the Mead organization.' 8
These sources enabled him to survive while his low prices forced the
local competitor out of business.
In this decision the Supreme Court seems to have made a reality of
Cyrus Austin's warning that:
"It is unsafe for a seller engaged in interstate commerce to assume
that his intrastate pricing policies are without the scope of the
[Clayton] Act, even where only intrastate competition appears to
be involved. There is always the possibility that the lowering of
his intrastate prices will be held to be supported by the higher
prices charged interstate purchasers; and this would undoubtedly
be the case if such a seller should lower his price throughout an
intrastate area to meet (or beat) local competition."' 0
The qualifying clause of Section 2 (a) which requires a showing that
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially (1) to lessen com-
petition or (2) tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
(3) to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination
also has presented difficulty in interpretation. The first two of these
"effects" were part of the original Clayton Act,20 and the third was added
by the Robinson-Patman Act. Protection to individual competitors was
" Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115, 118 (1954).
's Defendant was affiliated with an interlocked chain of bakeries operating in
southwest United States. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said the fact
that the stockholders and officers of the Mead Company in New Mexico were also
stockholders and officers of other Mead organizations would not prove that the
price war affected interstate commerce in the absence of a showing that the inter-
locking corporate ownership was related to the price war. Mead's Fine Bread Co.
v. Moore, 208 F. 2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1953).
" Austin, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 17 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953).
2038 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
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intended by this language,21 but the problem remains whether injury to
an intrastate operator will fulfill the requirement.
In cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission public policy is
of primary importance, and some probability must exist that interstate
commerce will suffer one of the proscribed effects.2 2 However, private
damage actions under the third possible effect involve no general public
policy,23 but the question remains whether the commerce or competition
injured must be interstate. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit took the view in Moore v. Mead that it was still neces-
sary for the plaintiff to prove an effect on interstate commerce.2 4 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's decision in the Mead case 25 appears to take
the view that an injury caused by price discriminations of one engaged
in interstate commerce against an individual merchant competing locally
will come under the prohibition of the Clayton Act regardless of the
resulting effect on conditions in interstate commerce. The argument
that the destroyed competition did not have to be interstate was sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court in the Mead case2 6 and was apparently
accepted by the following language in the Court's opinion: "The de-
struction of competition was plainly established as required by Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act." The only competition involved was that
between Moore and Mead in Santa Rosa, New Mexico-which seems
entirely intrastate. Therefore, it appears that in treble damage actions
under Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,2 7 so long as the jurisdictional
21 The original Clayton Act was "too restrictive, in requiring a showing of
general injury to competitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas
the more immediately important concern is an injury to the competitor victimized
by the discrimination." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
"2 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948) ; Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726 (1945) ; Samuel
H. Moss Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Min-
neapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 191 Fed. 2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 206 (1952).
2'3 Reid v. Doubleday and Co., 109 F. Supp. 354 (D. Ohio 1952) ; Myers v. Shell
Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951).
"2 Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950), rev'.d on other
grounds, 340 U. S. 944 (1951).
" Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954).
2" Brief of Petitioner, Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115
(1954).
"' This is also true under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. See note 14
mspra. The Supreme Court, in disposing of the added requirement in Section 3-
"for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor"-which
replaces the qualifying clause of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, said there was
ample evidence to support a finding that defendant's purpose in the price war was
to eliminate a competitor. Again an intrastate competitor appears sufficient. Other
cases involving violations of Section 3 are: Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice and Cold
Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp.
408 (D. Conn. 1950); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796
(S. D. Cal. 1950); Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE REG. RE'. (1950-
51 Trade Cas.) 62,859 (N. D. Ill. 1951).
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requirement is met, any destruction of a competitor-in either intrastate
or interstate competition-will per se satisfy the qualifying clause.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Moore v. Mead
extends coverage of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, beyond any previous interpretation. This is in
keeping with the original intentions of the proponents of the Robinson-
Patman amendment to provide more protection to small business.
28
"AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND -RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SoN-PATMAN ACT 1 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953); Evans, Anti-
Price Discriminationt Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. Rxv. 140 (1936).
